13 April 1977

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SUBJECT: National Intelligence Steering Group Meeting, 6 April 1977

1. Members attending the meeting were: Mr. Robert Bowie, Chairman; Mr. Richard Lehman, IC; MGen. Lincoln Faurer, DIA; Mr. Martin Packman, INR; and Dr. Sayre Stevens, CIA.
Assessment Working Group for PRM/NSC No. 10 (see Attachment A), briefed the Steering Group on the progress of the Net Assessment Working Group. Eleven task groups have been formed (see Attachment B for the task groups and the DCI's representative on each). Each of the eleven task groups is working independently of the others, and each will collect contributions that its members are asked, or see fit, to contribute. The chairmen of the task groups will write overviews of the work contributed by their groups. These overviews, in turn, will be used by Dr. Samuel Huntington, Chairman of the Net Assessment Working Group, to draft the report for the net assessment portion of the response to PRM 10.
3. Mr. Bowie then briefed the Steering Group on the meeting of the SCC Net Assessment Group on Tuesday, 5 April, which had before it the Interim Report of Dr. Huntington. He noted that the studies being prepared for this group seemed to divide up the topic from different perspectives and therefore overlapped considerably. There had been discussion as to whether the final product was to be mainly a dynamic assessment of US-USSR relative strengths, or an analysis of possible US strategies, as Dr. Huntington appeared to prefer. Finally, it was noted that two of the task groups, those dealing with Europe and Strategic Nuclear Policy and Force, may contribute to the work of both the SCC Net Assessment and PRC Military Strategy and Force Posture Working Groups.
Strategy and Force Posture Working Group, next briefed the Steering Group on the progress of the group on which he sits. His group has now developed an approach to its work. It has described six alternative US objectives, elaborated the principal issues for Presidential decision for the pursuit of each objective, and, in turn, detailed the alternative

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<u>substrat</u> egies and identified the implications for each issue. Mr.	
expressed the concern that, while this approach is coherent, it is far too comprehensive to permit an early analytical result. A	25X1
choice will have to be made as to which force postures are to be	
studied. anticipates that, with the group's deadline	25X1
drawing near and with analytical work not yet assigned, the Intelligence	
Community is in danger of being asked to respond to an overwhelming	
number of requests all at once. Though Secretary of Defense Brown	
intends to seek the President's <u>quidance as</u> to how the scope of the	
group's work might be narrowed, fears that the group may	25X1
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5. Mr. Stoertz, the DCI's representative on the Strategic Nuclear	
Policy and Force Net Assessment Task Group, briefed the Steering Group	
that:	
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the Strategic Task Group is organized;	
to the last three descriptions of the condensation and	
assignments have been made, and work is under way; and	
the Intelligence Community has been given four assignments	
for which the analysis and judgments can largely be drawn	
from extant, national intelligence products.	
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6. the DCI's representative on the European Net	25 X 1
Assessment lask Group, informed the Steering Group that:	
an outline of its report has been drafted;	
the State Department is drafting the political sections,	
while OSD is drafting the military; and	
the Intelligence Community has been assigned a section on	
Soviet political objectives; CIA's Office of Regional and	
Political Research is doing the drafting.	
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7. On behalf of DCI representative on and	25 X 1
<u>Chairman of the Intelligence Capabilities Net Assessment Task Group,</u>	
informed the Steering Group that:	25X1
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the Intelligence Group will limit itself to a net assessment	
of US and Soviet national collection systems;	
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the spadework has been commenced by CIA, DIA, NSA, and the FBI;	
special handling procedures are being investigated to meet	
the concerns of NSA about the sensitivity of the information	
that will be contained in this Group's product; and	
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-- the vulnerabilities of both US and Soviet intelligence collection systems will be highlighted.

Mr. Bowie noted the difficulty of this Group's attempting to define alternative US intelligence strategies before other task groups define the strategies that should govern the intelligence strategy selected. The DCI's representative for the covert action portion of this task group's work, was called away before he could make his report to the Steering Group.)
8. DCI representative on the Technology Net Assessment Task Group, briefed the Steering Group that:
this group will do a technology-by-technology comparison;
 eleven technologies have been selected for comparison, and sub-task groups have been formed to perform the comparisons on each; and
after two-to-three day meetings of intelligence and research and development experts, each sub-task group will produce a six-page paper that will be used to draft the report of the parent group. will circulate a memorandum to the members of the Steering Group on the character of each of the sub-task groups.)

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- 9. During the Steering Group's discussion of the briefings reported above, Mr. Bowie expressed concern that it may be difficult to protect the integrity of the judgments of the Intelligence Community as they are integrated into the products of the task groups by policy drafters. The other members of the Steering Group shared Mr. Bowie's concern, and it was agreed that the DCI's representatives on the various task groups should, to the extent possible, protect intelligence judgments in the task groups' various reports by noting that the reports' judgments are derived from certain national intelligence issuances.
- 10. During the discussion of the above briefings, it was further noted that:
 - --work is being performed outside the formal PRM 10 structure that, ultimately, may be critical to the final outcome;
 - --while overlap exists in the work of some task groups, coordination has been good in that of others, particularly in the work of those dealing with East Asia-Pacific and Africa;
 - -- the work of the SCC and PRC Groups in PRM 10 may, in the end, not be integrated;

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
- --the critical point for the Intelligence Community will come when it has the opportunity to review the final draft of the executive summary of the final report.
- 11. Dr. Stevens expressed his desire that DCI representatives on the various net assessment task groups report to the Steering Group on what work they had assigned to which components of the Intelligence Community. Mr. Bowie agreed that this information would be useful to have. The Secretary of the Steering Group will ask the DCI's representatives for this information and circulate it to the Steering Group's members when it becomes available.
- 12. The Steering Group, finally, considered when a next meeting would be desirable. It decided that a meeting should be called when the Military Strategy and Force Posture Working Group makes its work assignments.

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Attachments: A & B

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